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Abstract
Recent macroeconomic literature stressed the importance of expectations
heterogeneity in the formulation of monetary policy. We use a stylized macro
model of Howitt (1992) to investigate the dynamical consequences of alter-
native interest rate rules when agents have heterogeneous expectations and
update their beliefs over time along the lines of Brock and Hommes (1997).
We ﬁnd that the outcome of diﬀerent monetary policies in terms of stability
crucially depends on the ecology of forecasting rules and on the intensity
of choice among diﬀerent predictors. We also show that, when agents have
heterogeneous expectations, an interest rate rule that obeys the Taylor prin-
ciple does not always lead the system to converge to the rational expectations
equilibrium but multiple equilibria may persist.
1JEL codes: E52, D83, D84, C62.
Keywords: Heterogeneous Expectations, Monetary Policy, Cumulative Process,
Taylor Rule.
21 Introduction
The rational representative agent approach is still the core assumption in macroeco-
nomics. However in the last decade agents’ heterogeneity is playing an increasingly
important role in macro economics and monetary policy debates.
In contrast, in behavioral ﬁnance, bounded rationality and heterogeneous agent
models have been developed as a concrete alternative to the standard rational
representative agent approach, as discussed e.g. in the extensive surveys of LeBaron
(2006) and Hommes (2006). Although bounded rationality and adaptive learning
have become increasingly important in macroeconomics, most models still assume
a representative agent who is learning about the economy. Only few models take
seriously into account the role of heterogeneous expectations and how monetary
policy should be conducted when heterogeneity is explicitly introduced in a macro
and monetary policy framework. See e.g. Evans and Honkapohja (2001) for an
extensive survey on learning in macro economics. Some examples of macro models
with heterogeneous expectations include Brock and de Fontnouvelle (2000), Evans
and Honkapohja (2003, 2006), Branch and Evans (2006), Honkapohja and Mitra
(2006), Branch and McGough (2006, 2008), Berardi (2007), Tuinstra and Wagener
(2007), Brazier, Harrison, King, and Yates (2008) and De Grauwe (2008).
The aim of our paper is to investigate how heterogeneity in agents’ expectations
aﬀects macro ﬂuctuations and stability of the economy and how diﬀerent monetary
policy rules can enhance stability when agents have heterogeneous expectations
about future inﬂation. Recently, Branch (2004), Santoro and Pfajfar (2006) and
Pfajfar (2008) provided empirical evidence on heterogeneous expectations using
survey data on inﬂation expectations.
We employ the simple macro-monetary policy model of Howitt (1992, 2006) to
investigate the dynamic consequences of a monetary policy aimed at pegging the
interest rate, when agents have heterogeneous expectations about inﬂation rate.
We adopt a conventional IS-LM model in which agents form expectations about
3the future rate of inﬂation using diﬀerent forecasting rules, and where diﬀerent
beliefs are aggregated linearly. In addition, we employ an Adaptive Belief System
introduced in Brock and Hommes (1997), so that agents switch from one forecasting
rule to another on the basis of past performances of these rules. We analyze
the inﬂation dynamics in such a model, using theoretical and numerical tools,
for diﬀerent types of forecasting rules.
Our paper contributes to the debate about the feasibility of a policy of interest
rate pegging. According to Friedman (1968), controlling interest rates tightly is
not a feasible monetary policy. Friedman argues that if the real interest rate in
the economy does not coincide with a hypothetical (“natural”) level corresponding
to full employment, then inﬂation will follow a cumulative process. Consider an
example where the Central Bank pegs the nominal interest rate too low, i.e. given
the expected rate of inﬂation the real interest rate is below its natural level. Excess
aggregate demand will then cause inﬂation to rise more than expected because of
an expectations-augmented Phillips curve. In response to an unexpectedly high
increase of inﬂation, people will adjust their expectations upwards, and the Fisher
eﬀect will put upward pressure on the interest rate. A monetary expansion will
thus be required to maintain the peg and this will cause inﬂation to accelerate
even further until the policy is abandoned. Likewise, if the interest rate is pegged
too high, deﬂation will accelerate until the policy is abandoned. The cumulative
process argument disappeared from the literature after the rational expectations
revolution. However, Howitt (1992) pointed out that in an economy in which
people try to acquire rational expectations through learning, a monetary policy
aimed at controlling tightly the interest rate will lead inevitably to the cumulative
process. Indeed, in a world in which any departure of expected inﬂation from its
equilibrium level causes an overreaction of the actual inﬂation rate and generates
a misleading signal for the agents, a forecasting rule that tries to learn from past
mistakes will lead the economy away from equilibrium causing inﬂation/deﬂation
to accelerate until the interest rate pegging policy is abandoned. Howitt (1992)
4shows that the cumulative process arises for any plausible adaptive learning rule.
He also shows that if the interest rate pegging monetary policy is abandoned in
favor of a Taylor rule the cumulative process is stabilized. The aim of our paper
is to investigate the potentially destabilizing eﬀect of interest rate pegging and
the potentially stabilizing eﬀect of a Taylor rule in a world with heterogeneous
expectations. As we will see, the answers will depend on the ecology of forecasting
rules.
The analysis performed in our paper shows that Howitt’s results will not always
hold in a world with heterogeneous agents. In particular, the cumulative process is
not always arising when the monetary authority pegs the nominal interest rate. As
an example, when there is a perfectly rational agent type in the market, even if the
implemented policy leads to the cumulative process, this process is not permanent,
and dynamics converge to a complex attractor with phases of inﬂation and/or
deﬂation. Along the inﬂation/deﬂation paths, forecasting errors of non-rational
agents will increase and the majority switches to rational expectations, forcing the
inﬂation rate back close to its natural level. We also investigate the dynamics in
an economy characterized by a continuum of constant forecasting rules by means
of the notion of Large Type Limit (LTL hereafter) introduced in Brock, Hommes,
and Wagener (2005) and we consider the impact of alternative monetary policy
rules.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we brieﬂy recall the
ideas behind the cumulative process and the benchmark IS-LM model as described
in Howitt (1992, 2006). The model with heterogeneous expectations is introduced
in Section 3, where an example of rational versus naive agents is analyzed. In
particular, we compare the policy of the nominal interest rate pegging with the
Taylor rule when the nominal interest rate is set in response on the inﬂation level.
Sections 4 and 5 present the case of an ecology of constant forecasting rules in the
case of interest rate pegging as well as in the case of a Taylor rule. We study both
the case when the number of forecasting rules is small (e.g. 3 or 5) and the case of
5an arbitrarily large number of rules. Section 6 concludes.
2 Interest Rate Rules and Cumulative Process
In this section we recall the formalization developed by Howitt (2006) of the in-
stability problem implied by the Wicksellian cumulative process. Consider the
following system of equations that describes a simple IS-LM model:






t + ϕyt , (2.2)
where yt is the output gap, it is the nominal interest rate, πt and πe
t are respectively
the actual and expected inﬂation rates, r∗ is the natural rate of interest, and σ and
ϕ are positive coeﬃcients. Equation (2.1) is the usual IS curve in which the real
interest rate it−πe
t must equal the natural rate in order for output to equal its “full
employment” capacity, here normalized to zero. Equation (2.2) is the expectations-
augmented Phillips curve expressed in terms of inﬂation and output.
Let us assume that the monetary authority decides to peg the nominal interest
rate at level ι. Under rational expectations the expected rate of inﬂation coincides
with the actual inﬂation, and, according to (2.2), the economy is in the state of
full employment, y∗ = 0. From (2.1) the rate of inﬂation in the RE equilibrium
depends positively on the pegged nominal interest rate:
π
∗ = ι − r
∗ .
Thus, assuming rational expectations the interest rate pegging is a feasible mone-
tary policy: accelerating or decelerating inﬂation will not arise because the system
will immediately reach the equilibrium level.
However, the policy implications change dramatically when the rational expec-
tations assumption is relaxed, and expectations are revised in an adaptive, bound-
6edly rational way. To illustrate the failure of the interest rate pegging policy, let us
assume that the nominal interest rate is pegged too low, so that the real interest
rate ι−πe
t is below its natural level r∗. In that case, inﬂation expectations will be
higher than the equilibrium inﬂation π∗. Actual inﬂation will be even higher than







This means that the signal that the agents receive from the market is misleading.
Even though inﬂation was overestimated with respect to the equilibrium level (πe
t >
π∗), realized inﬂation suggests that agents underestimated it, i.e. (πt > πe
t). Any
reasonable rule that tries to learn from past mistakes will then lead agents to
expect even higher inﬂation, causing a cumulative process of accelerating inﬂation.
Similarly, pegging the interest rate too high will lead to a cumulative process of
accelerating deﬂation. It implies that interest pegging is not a feasible monetary
policy.
The actual dynamics depends, of course, on the forecasting rule that agents use
to form their expectations. As an illustrative example, consider the case of naive
expectations, when agents expect that current inﬂation will persist the next period,
πe






t + ϕyt ,
where xe
t = πe
t − π∗ and xt = πt − π∗ are respectively the deviations of the ex-
pected and actual inﬂation from the RE steady state. The dynamics under naive
expectations is described by the following linear equation
xt = (1 + ϕσ)xt−1 , (2.3)
7whose unique steady-state corresponds to the RE equilibrium, x∗ = 0. This steady-
state is, however, unstable, and thus pegging the interest rate at a non-equilibrium
level, will lead to a cumulative process.
So far we have discussed a simple IS-LM model considering a monetary insti-
tution that follows a nominal interest rate pegging monetary policy rule. Howitt
(1992) proposed an alternative strategy to model monetary policy in order to sta-
bilize inﬂation under adaptive learning dynamics, i.e. under the assumption that
agents are not rational. He showed that the cumulative process can be avoided
when the Central Bank adopts a monetary policy rule that makes the nominal in-
terest rate respond to the rate of inﬂation more than point for point. This monetary
policy rule has become known as the “Taylor” principle, after Taylor (1993).
Suppose that a simple Taylor rule is used in the example with naive expectations
discussed above. Assume that announcing the nominal interest rate the Central
Bank responds to the inﬂation rate according to the following relation:
it = φππt , where φπ > 1. (2.4)
The coeﬃcient φπ measures the response of the nominal interest rate to changes
in the inﬂation rate πt. A Taylor rule with φπ > 1 reﬂects an important idea: the
nominal interest rate should be changed by more than one percentage point for
each percentage point change in inﬂation. Under the Taylor rule (2.4) and naive





which diﬀers from (2.3) only in the slope coeﬃcient. It is immediately clear that
for a Taylor rule (2.4) with φπ > 1, the RE equilibrium is globally stable and the
cumulative process will not arise.
83 Rational versus Naive
Will the cumulative process arise in an economy where agents have heterogeneous
expectations about the future level of the inﬂation rate? To address this question we
employ the framework of Adaptive Belief Systems proposed in Brock and Hommes
(1997) to model heterogeneous expectations. Assume that agents can form expec-
tations choosing from H diﬀerent forecasting rules. We denote by xe
h,t the forecast
of the deviation of inﬂation from its RE equilibrium level given by rule h. The
fraction of agents using forecasting rule h at time t is denoted by nh,t. Assuming
that individual expectations can be aggregated linearly1, actual inﬂation in the
model (2.1)–(2.2) under the interest rate pegging is given by






The evolutionary part of the model describes the updating of beliefs over time.
Fractions are updated according to an evolutionary ﬁtness measure. The ﬁtness
measures of all strategies are publicly available, but subject to noise. Fitness is
derived from a random utility model and given by
e Uh,t = Uh,t + εh,t ,
where Uh,t is the deterministic part of the ﬁtness measure and εh,t represent IID
noise across h = 1,...,H. As proposed in Brock and Hommes (1997), in order
to obtain analytical expressions for the probabilities or fractions, we will assume
that the noise εh,t is drawn from a double exponential distribution. In that case,
in the limit as the number of agents goes to inﬁnity, the probability that an agent
chooses strategy h is given by the well known discrete choice model (see Manski
1The model we are considering doesn’t have an explicit microfoundation and it is composed
by linear aggregate equations. Hence substituting expectations terms with a convex combination
of diﬀerent subjective expectations is the most natural way to proceed. Recent papers, such
as Adam (2007), Arifovic, Bullard, and Kostyshyna (2007), Brazier, Harrison, King, and Yates
(2008), De Grauwe (2008) follow the same approach.






Note that the higher the ﬁtness of a forecasting rule h, the higher the probability
that an agent will select the strategy h. The parameter β is called intensity of
choice and it reﬂects the sensitivity of the mass of agents to selecting the optimal
prediction strategy. The intensity of choice β is inversely related to the variance of
the noise term. The case β = 0 corresponds to the situation of inﬁnite variance in
which diﬀerences in ﬁtness can not be observed, so agents do not switch between
strategies and all fractions are constant and equal to 1/H. The case β = ∞
corresponds to the situation without noise in which the deterministic part of the
ﬁtness can be observed perfectly and in every period all agents choose the best
predictor. We use as a performance measure past squared forecast errors
Uh,t−1 = −(xt−1 − x
e
h,t−1)
2 − Ch , (3.3)
where Ch is the cost of predictor h.
As a ﬁrst application of the ABS in this section we consider the case in which
there are two groups of agents, one with rational expectations (perfect foresight),
i.e. xe
1,t = xt, and one with naive expectations, i.e. xe
2,t = xt−1. In a world with
heterogeneous expectations perfect foresight requires knowledge about the predic-
tions of all other agents in the population. Therefore we assume that in order to
obtain the perfect foresight forecast agents will have to pay information gathering
costs C ≥ 0 per period, whereas the naive forecast is available for free. We inves-
tigate and compare two possible monetary policy rules, interest rate pegging and
the Taylor rule, in the case of rational versus naive expectations.
103.1 Interest Rate Pegging
Under interest rate pegging the dynamics of the model with rational versus naive
agents is described by
xt =
(1 + ϕσ)(1 − n1,t)
1 − n1,t(1 + ϕσ)
xt−1 , (3.4)
where the fraction of agents with perfect foresight is evolving according to
n1,t =
e−βC
e−βC + e−β(xt−1−xt−2)2 .
The following result describes the steady state properties of this two-dimensional
system:
Proposition 3.1. The dynamics given by (3.2) and (3.4) has a unique steady-state
with x∗ = 0 and n∗
1 = e−βC
1+e−βC ≤ 1
2. This “Rational Expectations” steady state is
unstable for all costs C ≥ 0.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The RE equilibrium with full employment is the only steady-state of the model.
In this steady-state both types of agents give the same correct forecast. The pop-
ulation, however, is split unequally and dominated by naive agents, because of the
costs of the perfect foresight predictor. The RE equilibrium is a locally unstable
steady-state, which suggests that interest rate pegging is not a feasible policy, not
even when the information gathering costs C = 0.
In order to get some intuition for the dynamics of the model, in Fig. 1 we plot
the graph of the slope of (3.4) as a function of the fraction n1,t of rational agents.
In this way one can interpret the behavior of rational agents given their knowledge
about the distribution of agents over the two types. Recall that if all agents are
naive, i.e. in the case n1,t = 0 labeled N in Fig. 1, the cumulative process in (2.3)
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1−n1,t(1+ϕσ) , representing the slope of the map in Eq. (3.4) as
a function of n1,t. In this ﬁgure parameters are such that ϕσ = 2.
Fig. 1, the system immediately jumps to the RE steady-state. Fig. 1 shows that in
the intermediate case, when agents have heterogeneous expectations, the perfect
foresight agents can either reinforce (the left part of the curve) or counterbalance
(the right part of the curve) the cumulative process, depending on the relative
weight of rational agents in the population. When the fraction of rational agents
is relatively low, i.e. n1,t < 1/(1 + ϕσ), the cumulative process is reinforced with
accelerating inﬂation or deﬂation even stronger than under naive expectations.
When the fraction of rational agents is relatively high, i.e. n1,t > 1/(1 + ϕσ),
rational agents counterbalance and reverse the cumulative process. But only when
the fraction of rational agents is suﬃciently large, i.e. n1,t > (2 + ϕσ)/(2 + 2ϕσ)
the counterbalancing of rational agents leads to a stable process. Notice that at
the steady state n∗
1 ≤ 1/2 ≤ (2 + ϕσ)/(2 + 2ϕσ), so that at the steady state the
counterbalancing eﬀort of rational agents leads to an unstable process.
Thus, only when the naive agents dominate the population, the cumulative pro-
cess can start. However, along such a process, the naive agents make larger and
larger prediction errors. When these errors overcome the costs of the perfect fore-

























































































Figure 2: Dynamics of the evolutionary model with rational vs. naive agents. De-
viations of inﬂation from the RE level (upper parts) is shown against an evolution
of the fraction of the perfect foresight agents (lower parts). The threshold value
1/(1+ϕσ) is shown by the dotted line. Left panel: β = 1. Right panel: β = 3.
as Proposition 3.1 suggests, this is not enough to stabilize the RE. Notice from
Fig. 1 that the deviation of inﬂation from its RE value will decrease only when the
fraction of the perfect foresight agents n1,t > (2+ϕσ)/(2+2ϕσ) > 1/2. But close to
the equilibrium value, when both forecasting rules give similar errors, the fraction
of rational agents falls below 1/2. Thus, when the inﬂation starts to approach the
equilibrium level, more and more agents will switch back to the less-costly naive
predictor.
This mechanism is illustrated in Fig. 2, where the dynamics of the actual de-
viation of inﬂation from the RE steady state and the evolution of the fraction of
perfect foresight agents are shown for two levels of the intensity of choice β. In
both cases we observe phases in which the actual deviation of inﬂation from the RE
steady state is relatively small and phases in which this deviation is relatively high.
As explained above, during the phases with small deviations from the steady state,
the economy is dominated by naive agents, while the phases with high deviations
always end up by massive switching to the perfect foresight predictor. There is an
important diﬀerence between two cases. When the intensity of choice is low (the
left panel), the fraction of the rational agents never falls below the threshold value
1/(1 + ϕσ). The cumulative process never starts in this case because the fraction






































































Figure 3: Phase diagram, (xt,n1,t), in the evolutionary model with perfect fore-
sighting and naive agents. Left panel: β = 0.5. Middle panel: β = 1. Right



































































































Figure 4: Delay plot, (xt,xt−1), in the evolutionary model with perfect foresighting
and naive agents. Left panel: β = 0.5. Middle panel: β = 1. Right panel:
β = 3.
When the intensity of choice is high (the right panel), the cumulative process oc-
curs when the fraction of the rational agents falls below the threshold value. As
the cumulative process evolves, forecasting errors of naive agents increase and at
some point, for a large intensity of choice, almost all agents will switch to rational
expectations, thus stabilizing the cumulative process and forcing inﬂation close to
its RE steady state. With inﬂation close to steady state, the fraction of agents
using the cheap naive forecast increases, and a new cumulative process may arise.
Figs. 3 and 4 compare the phase diagrams and delay plots for three diﬀerent
values of the intensity of choice. We observe that the system converges to a two-
cycle for small values of β, but as soon as the intensity of choice increases the strange
attractors and chaotical behavior occur. Indeed a rational route of randomness in
inﬂation rates, that is, a bifurcation route to complicated dynamics, arises when
the intensity of choice becomes large2.
2A diﬀerence with the rational route to randomness in the cobweb model of Brock and Hommes
(1997) is that in our macro model it starts oﬀ from a stable 2-cycle (the steady state is always
14Our analysis shows that in an economy with heterogeneous agents with perfect
foresight versus naive expectations about future inﬂation, a monetary policy that
pegs the nominal interest rate will not lead to an ever accelerating cumulative pro-
cess. However, the inﬂation is not stable, but rather switches irregularly between
an unstable phase of a temporary cumulative process or unstable counterbalanc-
ing when the fraction of rational agents is relatively small and phases of stable
counterbalancing when the fraction of rational agents is relatively large.
3.2 Taylor Rule
In this section we consider a Central Bank that responds to the inﬂation rate by
means of a simple Taylor rule as deﬁned in equation (2.4). Under a Taylor rule,





where the constant k ≡
1+ϕσ




e−βC + e−β(xt−1−xt−2)2 . (3.6)
Under a Taylor rule with φπ > 1, the coeﬃcient k belongs to the interval (0,1). It
is then obvious that for any n1,t the map (3.5) is a contraction. It leads to
Proposition 3.2. The dynamics (3.5)–(3.6) under a monetary policy Taylor rule
has a unique, globally stable RE steady-state with x∗ = 0 and n∗
1 = e−βC
1+e−βC.
Hence, in an economy with rational versus naive agents, for any costs of the
rational forecast the Taylor rule stabilizes inﬂation dynamics.
unstable), while in the cobweb model it starts oﬀ from a stable steady state.
154 Interest Rate Pegging with Fundamentalists and
Biased Beliefs
In this section we consider an interest rate pegging monetary policy rule when
agents can choose between diﬀerent constant “steady state” predictors to forecast
future inﬂation. This case can be interpreted as a situation in which agents roughly
know the fundamental steady state of the economy, but agents are boundedly ra-
tional in the sense that they have distorted perceptions of equilibrium values. We
can thus assume that forecasting correctly the RE equilibrium value of inﬂation
x∗ = 0 requires some cognitive eﬀorts and information gathering costs, which will
be incorporated in the cost term C ≥ 0. Alternatively we can think about this case
as a situation in which all agents have access to the same information about the
fundamentals of the economy, at zero cost for example, but, nevertheless they may
decide diﬀerently about forecasting future inﬂation. Realized inﬂation and expec-
tations will co-evolve over time and evolutionary selection based on reinforcement
learning will decide which kind of forecasting rule performs better and will survive
in the evolutionary environment. An important question at this point is: what
kind of monetary policy should a central bank implement to stabilize inﬂation in
such an environment? In this section we investigate the dynamic eﬀects of a mone-
tary policy aimed at pegging the nominal interest rate in a world of heterogeneous
boundedly rational agents. The class of constant forecasts is extremely simple, but
may include any potential steady state level. For this simple ecology of rules it will
be possible to obtain analytical results, in examples with only a few rules as well
as examples with a large number or even a continuum of constant rules.
164.1 Evolutionary Dynamics with Few Constant Beliefs Types











with bias parameter b > 0. Type 1 agents believe that the inﬂation rate will be
always at its RE level and so their expected deviation will be zero. Type 2 agents
have a positive bias, expecting that inﬂation will be above the fundamental level,
while type 3 agents have a negative bias, expecting an inﬂation level below the
fundamental value. Assuming that the equilibrium predictor is available at cost
C ≥ 0 and substituting the forecasting rules of the three groups of agents into (3.1)
we get
xt = (1 + ϕσ)(n2,tb − n3,tb) = fβ(xt−1), (4.1)

















In what follows we will ﬁx the parameters ϕ, σ, and b and consider the intensity of
choice β as bifurcation parameters3. We will make a distinction between the case
3Changes in the product of the IS slope σ and the Phillips curve’s slope ϕ, as well as changes
in the bias parameter b will only aﬀect the steady state values of non-RE steady states and the




































Figure 5: Maps with 3 types of beliefs and high cost C. Parameter values are
ϕσ = 0.1, b = 1 and C = 1.
in which the equilibrium predictor is available at a relatively high cost and the case
in which it is freely available (or available at a relatively low cost). Notice that the
dynamics in (4.1) is described by a 1-dimensional map fβ, and a straightforward
computation shows that fβ is increasing.
Let us start with the case in which the fundamental predictor has relatively high
cost. Fig. 5 shows the maps fβ for small, medium and high values of the intensity
of choice parameter β. When the intensity of choice is relatively low, there exists
only one steady state, the RE steady state, which is globally stable. For low
intensity of choice agents are more or less evenly distributed over the diﬀerent
forecasting rules and as a result realized inﬂation will remain relatively close to
the fundamental steady state. As the intensity of choice increases, the RE steady
state loses stability in a (supercritical) pitchfork bifurcation and two new stable
non-fundamental steady states are created. The economic intuition behind the fact
that non-fundamental steady states exist for high intensity of choice is as follows.
Suppose that the intensity of choice is high and that at time t, the deviation xt
is close to the optimistic belief, that is, xt ≈ b. The optimistic belief forecast will
then perform better than the pessimistic and the fundamental belief and therefore,
when the intensity of choice is high, almost all agents will use the optimistic belief,
i.e. n2,t+1 ≈ 1, implying that xt+1 ≈ b(1 + ϕσ). In fact, it is easily seen that for
bifurcation values at which multiple steady states appear, but they will not alter the qualitative
bifurcation scenario as discussed below.




































Figure 6: Maps with 3 types of beliefs and low cost C = 0.5.
β = +∞ the map f∞ has non-fundamental steady states x+ = b(1 + ϕσ). The
same intuition explains existence of a negative non-fundamental steady state for
high intensity of choice.
Consider now the case in which the equilibrium predictor has zero (or relatively
low) costs. We can think about this case as a situation in which all agents have free
access to the relevant information, but agents make some computational mistakes
or they just think that in a heterogeneous world not every agent will behave the
same and try to anticipate deviations from RE equilibrium. Fig. 6 shows graphs of
the map fβ for small, medium and high values of the intensity of choice parameter
β.
As before, when the intensity of choice β is relatively low we have a unique
globally stable fundamental steady state x∗ = 0. As β increases, as before the
fundamental steady state loses stability in a (supercritical) pitchfork bifurcation in
which two additional stable non-fundamental steady states are created4. However,
as β increases further, we have a second pitchfork bifurcation, this time a subcrit-
ical pitchfork bifurcation, in which the RE steady state becomes stable again and
two additional unstable steady states are created. In the case of low costs for fun-
damentalists, we thus have three stable steady states, x∗ = 0, x+ > 0 and x− < 0
for high values of the intensity of choice β. The economic intuition that, if the
costs for the fundamental rule are low, the fundamental steady state will be stable
4Appendix B derives conditions under which the zero steady state does or does not lose stability
for intermediate values of the intensity of choice β.




































Figure 7: Top panels: Maps with 5 types of beliefs and low cost C for diﬀerent
values of β. Lower panel: Bifurcation diagram for 5 belief types (cost C = 0)
with respect to the intensity of choice. Solid lines indicate stable equilibria and
dashed lines unstable equilibria.
for high intensity of choice is simple: when the system is close to the fundamental
steady state, a cheap fundamental rule is the best predictor, causing more agents
to switch to the fundamental rule.
Fig. 7 illustrates graphs of the 1-D map when there are ﬁve strategy types
bh ∈ {−1,−1/2,0,1/2,1} when the cost C of the fundamental predictor are low as
well as the bifurcation diagram. For small and medium values of β the bifurcation
scenario is similar to the three types case. However for high values of the intensity
of choice, four additional steady states, two stable and two unstable, are created
via saddle-node bifurcations.
4.2 Many Belief Types
The previous analysis shows that in an economy with an ecology of 3 or 5 funda-
mentalists and biased beliefs, a cumulative process leading to accelerating inﬂation
20or deﬂation does not arise. For high intensity of choice, the system will rather lock
in into one of the multiple steady state equilibria, with a majority of agents using
the forecasting rule with the smallest mistake at that equilibrium steady state.
A natural question addressed in this section is what happens when the number
of constant forecasting rules increases and approaches inﬁnity. As we will see, if
agents select beliefs from a continuum of forecasting rules, the cumulative process
will reappear.
Suppose there are H belief types bh, all available at zero costs. The evolutionary
dynamics with H belief types is given by




h=1 e−β(xt−1−bh)2 =: f
H
β (xt−1). (4.2)
The dynamics of the system with H belief types bH is described by a 1-D map
fH
β . What can be said about the dynamical behavior when H is large? In general,
it is diﬃcult to obtain analytical results for systems with many belief types. We
apply the concept of Large Type Limit (LTL) introduced in Brock, Hommes, and
Wagener (2005) to approximate the evolutionary systems with many beliefs type
in (4.2). Suppose that at the beginning of the economy, i.e. at period t = 0, all H
belief types b = bh ∈ R are drawn from a common initial distribution with density
ψ(b). We then can derive the LTL of the system as follows. Divide both numerator
and denominator of (4.2) by H and write the “H-type system” as









The LTL is then obtained by replacing the sample mean with the population mean
in both the numerator and the denominator, yielding




















Figure 8: LTL map for normal distribution of the initial beliefs. Left panel:
β = 1, Right panel: β = 1000.
As shown in Brock, Hommes, and Wagener (2005), when the number of strategies
H is suﬃciently large, the LTL dynamical system (4.3) is a good approximation of
the dynamical system with H belief types given by (4.2). In particular, if H is large
then with high probability the steady-states and their local stability conditions as
functions of β coincide for both the LTL map Fβ and the H-belief system map fH
β .
In other words, properties of the evolutionary dynamical system with many types
of agents can be studied using the LTL system.
For suitable distributions ψ(b) of initial beliefs, the LTL (4.3) can be computed
explicitly. As an illustrative example consider the case when ψ(b) is a normal
distribution ψ(b) ' N(0,s2). In Appendix C it is shown that in this case the LTL
map Fβ is linear, and given by
Fβ(x) = (1 + ϕσ)
2βs2
1 + 2βs2x. (4.4)
Fig. 8 illustrates graphs of the LTL maps for diﬀerent values of the intensity of
choice. For β = β∗ = 1
2s2ϕσ the slope of the linear map is exactly 1. Hence, the
fundamental equilibrium is globally stable for β < β∗ and unstable otherwise.
We thus come to the conclusion that, when initial beliefs are drawn from a
normal distribution and the number of belief types is suﬃciently high, an increase
in the intensity of choice beyond the bifurcation value β∗ leads to instability of the
system. Indeed, when β is low, agents are more or less equally distributed among
22predictors. This means that the average expected deviation of inﬂation will be close
to zero, hence realized inﬂation will be close to its fundamental value, more agents
will adopt the fundamental predictor and inﬂation will converge to its fundamental
value. However, when the intensity of choice increases and agents can switch faster
to better predictors, the cumulative process arises again.
It will be instructive to look at the limiting case where β = ∞. When there is a
continuum of beliefs, the best predictor in every period, according to past forecast
error, will be the predictor that coincides with last period’s inﬂation realization,
bh = xt−1. For β = ∞, all agents will switch to the optimal predictor. Hence, for
β = ∞, the economy with heterogenous agents updating their beliefs through rein-
forcement learning behaves exactly the same as an economy with a representative
naive agent, for which we already know that a cumulative process will arise.
Finally, note that increasing the variance s2 of the normal distribution of ini-
tial beliefs has exactly the same eﬀect on the LTL dynamics (4.4) as increasing
the intensity of choice. For s2 < 1
2βϕσ the LTL map is globally stable and it is
unstable otherwise. Hence, when many initial beliefs are drawn from a normal
distribution with small variance, the system will be stable, while it will be unstable
and a cumulative process will arise when many initial beliefs are drawn from a
normal distribution with large variance. The spread of initial beliefs is therefore an
important element for the stability of the economy.
General distribution of initial beliefs
In the previous example we have assumed that the distribution ψ(b) of initial beliefs
is a normal distribution. Applying the results derived in Hommes and Wagener
(2003), similar results are obtained for more general distributions functions of initial
beliefs.
As a ﬁrst observation, note that when the beliefs distribution ψ(b) is symmetric
around the RE equilibrium x∗ = 0, the latter will be a steady state for system
(4.3). This immediately follows from the observation that be−β(−b)2ψ(b) is an odd
23function.
Let ψ(b) be a ﬁxed continuous density function, that is, let ψ(b) ≥ 0 for all b
and
R











We recall the following result from Hommes and Wagener (2003) (Lemma 1, p. 10).
Lemma. Let J be the interior of the support of ψ, that is, J = int{b|ψ(b) ≥ 0}.
For all x ∈ J:
lim
β→∞





uniformly on all compact subsets K of J.
From this lemma, for example, it follows that for any strictly positive distribu-
tion function ψ describing initial beliefs, as the intensity of choice goes to inﬁnity,
the corresponding LTL-map converges to a linear map with slope 1+ϕσ. The LTL
map thus exhibits a cumulative process, when the intensity of choice becomes suﬃ-
ciently large. Hence, for systems with many belief types bh and initial beliefs drawn
from a ﬁxed strictly positive distribution function, a cumulative process arises with
high probability.
5 Taylor Rule with Fundamentalists and Biased
Beliefs
In this section we consider the dynamic consequences of an alternative monetary
policy rule as introduced in (2.4), namely
it = φππt . (5.1)


















Figure 9: LTL map under Taylor rule for β = 1, β = 5, β = 1000.
Plugging equation (5.1) in the system (2.1)-(2.2) and rewriting the model in devi-










When the central bank implements the interest rate rule described by (5.1), the













Under the assumption ψ(b) ≡ N(0,s2) the LTL map (5.3) is a linear map with














Hence an interest rate rule that responds aggressively to actual inﬂation, i.e. φπ > 1,
will fully stabilize the system.
5.2 Few types
Now consider the case the Central Bank implements a Taylor-type interest rate rule
and there are only three predictors available in the economy. The map describing




































Figure 10: Maps with 3 types of beliefs and high cost C.




(n2,tb − n3,tb). (5.4)
We will again consider the two diﬀerent cases in which the equilibrium predictor
is respectively available at a relatively high cost C and freely available. Fig. 10
depicts the dynamics of the system using the same parameterization as Section 4.1
for the coeﬃcient φπ = 1.5 and with a relatively high cost C.
In this case we observe that when the intensity of choice is relatively low the
RE equilibrium is unique and globally stable. However as β increases we have
that the zero steady becomes unstable after a supercritical pitchfork bifurcation.
We thus observe that when agents can switch faster between diﬀerent predictors,
the dynamics converges to equilibria diﬀerent from zero because of equilibrium
predictor’s relatively high costs. Fig. 11 shows instead the dynamics of the model
when the equilibrium predictor is freely available.
In this case we observe that the RE equilibrium remains locally stable when the
intensity of choice increases and four additional steady states, two stable and two
unstable, are created via saddle node bifurcation. The analysis performed in this
session shows that even if the interest rate rule followed by the central bank obeys
the Taylor principle, multiple equilibria can arise when only a few predictors are
available in the economy.




































Figure 11: Maps with 3 types of beliefs and zero cost C.
We conclude that if the number of strategies is ﬁnite, e.g. because of a ﬁnite
grid, a Taylor rule with φπ > 1 does not always stabilize inﬂationary dynamics and
multiple steady state equilibria may arise.
6 Conclusion
The analysis performed in the paper shows that in a world with heterogeneous
agents updating their beliefs over time according to an evolutionary ﬁtness measure,
the cumulative process is not always arising under an interest rate pegging policy.
Whether a cumulative process will arise under interest rate pegging depends on two
important features: (i) the ecology and the number of heterogeneous forecasting
rules, and (ii) the magnitude of the intensity of choice measuring how quickly agents
switch strategies.
In the case of rational versus naive agents the interest rate pegging will not lead
to an ever accelerating cumulative process. However an increase in the intensity
of choice leads to a bifurcation route to complicated dynamics. The inﬂation rate
undergoes phases with small deviations from the RE steady state, dominated by
naive agents, and phases with high deviations from the RE equilibrium which
always come to an end because of agents’ massive switching to the perfect foresight
predictor.
In the case of heterogeneous constant forecasting rules we observed that when
27the intensity of choice is relatively low the cumulative process does not arise in
both cases of few belief types and many belief types and the dynamics converges
to the unique RE steady state. However, when the intensity of choice parameter
is increasing, the system can converge to equilibria diﬀerent from the RE steady
state in the case of few belief types, or diverge because of the occurrence of the
cumulative process in the case many belief types.
The paper also investigates the dynamical consequences of a Taylor-type interest
rate rule. When the ecology of forecasting rules is composed by a perfect foresight
and a naive predictor, an interest rate rule that responds aggressively to inﬂation
fully stabilizes the system and the inﬂation rate converges to the RE steady state
level. In the case of constant belief types we observed that when many types
of predictors are available in the economy, an interest rate rule that obeys the
Taylor principle always stabilizes the system and the dynamics converges to the
RE equilibrium. However, when there is just a limited number of belief types,
multiple equilibria can arise.
28APPENDIX
A Proof of Proposition 3.1
The dynamical system describing the model with perfect foresight and naive agents is












We can rewrite the latter equation as a two-dimensional system by introducing zt = xt












wt = zt−1 .















1+e−βC. The eigenvalues are
λ1 = 0,
λ2 =
(1 + ϕσ)(1 − n∗
1)
1 − (1 + ϕσ)n∗
1
=







The numerator in expression of λ2 is always positive since 0 < n∗
1 < 1, while the denomi-
nator is positive if ϕσ < 1/e−βC. In this case we have that λ2 > 1. When ϕσ > 1/e−βC,
the stability condition implies
(1 + ϕσ)(1 − n∗
1)
1 − (1 + ϕσ)n∗
1
> −1 ⇒ (1+ϕσ)(1−n∗
1) < (1+ϕσ)n∗








29Since both ϕ and σ are positive coeﬃcients, the stability condition is never satisﬁed and
thus we conclude that |λ2| > 1. 
B 3 types system








t−1+C) + e−β(xt−1−b)2 + e−β(xt−1+b)2 = f(xt−1).
Now deﬁne k =
1+ϕσ
1+ϕσφπ and compute the derivative of the map f in the RE steady state
to get
f0(0) = k4βb2 e−βb2
2e−βb2 + e−βC = k4βb2 1
2 + e−β(C−b2) .
The stability condition is thus given by
f0(0) < 1 ⇒
4b2β








and consider the following two cases.
If C > b2 we have that h(β) is monotonically increasing in β. Thus, when β is higher
than the bifurcation value β∗ deﬁned as
β∗ : h(β∗) =
1
k
the zero steady state looses stability, as shown in the left panel of Fig. 12.
If C < b2 we have that the function h(β) is initially increasing in β and then decreas-

























Figure 12: Stability/Instability of the REE. Left panel: The case of high cost,
C > b2. Right panel: The case of small cost, C < b2.
We have that h0(β) = 0 when
2 + e−β(C−b2) + βe−β(C−b2)(C − b2) = 0.
Now deﬁne z ≡ (C − b2)β, so that the previous equation becomes
2 + e−z + ze−z = 0,
which can be rewritten as
2ez = −z − 1. (B.1)
Now, when C < b2, we have that z is a variable deﬁned over (−∞,0) since β is increasing
from 0 to ∞. This means that there is only one solution z∗ < 0 to the previous equation,
i.e. h(β) has only one optimum as shown in the right panel of Fig. 12.
We can ﬁnd an approximate numerical solution to (B.1) which is given by z∗ ≈
−1.46306. We then have that the maximum point β∗ is deﬁned through (C −b2)β∗ = z∗.
Plugging β∗ in h(β) we ﬁnd the maximum value of the function, which is given by
h(β∗) ≈
4b2β∗












This implies that given parameters b and C, the Central Bank can always implement an
interest rate rule that keeps the RE steady state stable.
C Large Type Limit
To analyse the LTL map we, ﬁrst, notice that the fractions nh,t will not be aﬀected if
a term that is independent from h is subtracted to all ﬁtnesses Uh,t−1. Subtracting the
term x2
t−1, we can substitute all the ﬁtnesses by
Uh,t−1 = −(xt−1 − bh)2 − x2
t−1 = 2xt−1bh − b2
h .
The LTL system can thus be rewritten as






Consider now the derivative of this map, called Fβ:
∂
∂x











































Deﬁning the density function
ξx,β(b) =
e−β(b2−2xb)ψ(b) Z
e−β(e b2−2xe b)ψ(e b)de b
,












= 2β V arξb,
where Eξb and V arξb are respectively the expected value and the variance of the stochas-
tic variable b distributed according to the probability density function ξ. The slope of
the LTL-map is then
∂
∂x
Fβ(x) = (1 + ϕσ)2β V arξb.
The condition for the stability of the steady state of the system (C.1) is given by
(1 + ϕσ)2β V arξb < 1. (C.2)
Consider now the case in which
ψ(b) ≡ N(0,s2)
33In this special case the LTL system is linear and thus the RE equilibrium is the unique
steady state. The slope is given by
∂
∂x
Fβ(x) = (1 + ϕσ)
2βs2
1 + 2βs2 .
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